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2Abstract
Objective: In England, two primary care incentive schemes were introduced to increase 
dementia diagnosis rates to two-thirds of expected levels.  This study assesses the 
effectiveness of these schemes.
Methods: We used a difference-in-differences framework to analyse the individual and 
collective impacts of the incentive schemes: (1) Directed Enhanced Service 18 (DES18: 
facilitating timely diagnosis of and support for dementia); (2) the Dementia Identification 
Scheme (DIS).  The dataset included 7,529 English general practices, of which 7,142 were 
active throughout the 10-year study period (April 2006 to March 2016).  We controlled for a 
range of factors, including a contemporaneous hospital incentive scheme for dementia.  Our 
dependent variable was the percentage of expected cases that was recorded on practice 
dementia registers (the rate).
Results: From March 2013 to March 2016, the mean rate rose from 51.8% to 68.6%.  Both 
DES18 and DIS had positive and significant effects. In practices participating in the DES18 
scheme, the rate increased by 1.44 percentage points more than the rate for non-
participants; DIS had a larger effect, with an increase of 3.59 percentage points. These 
combined effects increased dementia registers nationally by an estimated 40,767 
individuals.  Had all practices fully participated in both schemes, the corresponding number 
would have been 48,685.  
Conclusion:  The primary care incentive schemes appear to have been effective in closing 
the gap between recorded and expected prevalence of dementia, but the hospital scheme 
3had no additional discernible effect. This study contributes additional evidence that financial 
incentives can motivate improved performance in primary care. 
4Introduction
Dementia is a devastating long-term condition that is projected to place increasing demands 
on health and care services.1  In the absence of curative treatments, efforts are focused on 
reducing risk, timely diagnosis and early intervention.2  General practitioners (GPs) are 
uniquely placed to co-ordinate health and social care services for people with dementia and 
to address the support needs of the family and friends who care for them. 
The English Department of Healths Dementia strategy (2009) 3 and the Dementia Challenge 
(2012)4 highlighted the problem of underdiagnosis: it was estimated that around half of 
those with dementia did not have a formal diagnosis. Anticipated benefits of a formal 
diagnosis included improved access to relevant care and support services; empowering 
patients and their families to plan their lives better; prevention of avoidable health crises 
and further cognitive decline (when these are due to vascular risk factors);5 and 
improvements in the delivery of care and in communication between providers, patients 
and carers. 6
NHS England announced a £90m package to improve dementia diagnosis and care.7 The raft 
of measures included two financial incentive schemes in primary care and one hospital 
scheme. The aim of these tools and levers was to increase diagnosis rates to the level of 
67% of the expected number of people with the condition by March 2015 (the so-called 
two-thirds ambition).8  Whilst some interventions were designed to improve dementia care 
directly, financial incentives have been shown to be powerful levers in effecting behavioural 
changes in primary and secondary care.9 10 The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact 
of these financial incentives on diagnostic rates of dementia in primary care.
5Incentive schemes
The two primary care schemes for tackling underdiagnosis were the Directed Enhanced 
Service (DES18) and the Dementia Identification scheme (DIS).  The schemes were facilitated 
by a separate pay-for-performance scheme, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF).  
Since 2006, the QOF has incentivised good quality care for people with dementia, primarily 
via a face-to-face annual review,11-13 and requires practices to maintain a dementia register.  
We measured the schemes effectiveness in tackling underdiagnosis by the gap between the 
reported (recorded) and expected numbers on practices QOF dementia registers.14
DES18 ran from April 2013 to March 2016.15  The scheme encouraged a proactive approach 
to timely assessment of individuals at risk of dementia, followed-up by advanced care 
planning for newly diagnosed patients and a health check for carers. Participating practices 
received an upfront payment, and an annual end-of-year payment based on the proportion 
of national assessments the practice undertook. These payments were funded centrally by 
annual budgets of £21m for each of the two payments, making a total budget of £126m 
over the three years DES18 operated.
DIS operated for 6 months from 30 September 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was intended to 
support and complement DES18.16  NHS England paid GP practices £55 for each additional 
patient included on the QOF dementia register, based on the differential between the 
register at 30 September 2014 and 31 March 2015. Funding available for this scheme 
totalled £5m.17
A third scheme that incentivised hospitals (FAIR) ran in parallel with the primary care 
schemes, and we controlled for this in our analyses.  
6Methods
Data
Details of the datasets analysed are in Appendix A, and summary statistics for the outcome 
and control variables in our model are in Table 1.
TABLE 1 HERE
Study sample 
To be included in our study, practices had to have a QOF dementia register so that recorded 
and expected numbers of dementia patients could be calculated.  We compiled a panel of all 
eligible English practices that were open during the study period 2006-07 to 2015-16.  
For our base case analyses, our sample was a balanced panel of 7,142 practices that 
contributed data in all ten years. We undertook two sensitivity analyses. First, we re-
estimated using an unbalanced panel of 7,529 practices totalling 74,241 practice-year 
observations: this includes practices that closed, opened, split or merged during the study 
period. Second, we tested the implications of assuming that the effect of DES18 persisted 
after a practice had exited the scheme. 
Dependent variable
For two practices with identical dementia registers but with very different expected 
registers, the risk of an event (adding a patient to the dementia register) can vary 
considerably because practices with larger expected registers have greater capacity to 
improve. We defined our dependent variable as the percentage of expected cases of 
dementia that was recorded on the dementia register (the rate). 
7The numerator was the number of people recorded on the GP practices dementia register.  
The denominator was the expected number of patients aged 65 and over with dementia, 
which was based on the number, age and sex of a practices registered patients living in a 
nursing home; and on the number, age and sex of the remaining practice patients.  We 
distinguished nursing home patients from community-dwelling patients because the 
prevalence of dementia differs between the two groups.18
The General and Personal Medical Services dataset publishes annual data on the number, 
age and sex of a practices registered patients.  NHS Digital publishes annual data on the 
number of nursing home patients in a practice, but not by age and sex.  We therefore 
estimated the number of nursing home patients in each age / sex band using values for the 
national care home population taken from the 2011 Census.  Appendix A details the data 
sources used for these calculations. 
Defining Participation
Our key explanatory variables were practice participation in the two schemes. We used the 
following rules to define participation.
Practices were deemed to have participated in DES18 in a particular year in the period 2013-
14 to 2015-16 if they reported data on the number of dementia assessments undertaken 
that year, even if that number was zero.  Practices not reporting assessment data were 
deemed to be non-participants. 
Practices participating in DIS were required to report monthly data on recorded dementia 
diagnoses for September 2014 and for at least one month from October 2014 to March 
2015. 16  However, some practices that submitted monthly data did not take part in DIS.  
8NHS England provided us with a DIS participant list based on information collected by Local 
Area Teams for payment purposes. 
Covariates
One of the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) national targets,19  the 
hospital incentive scheme FAIR was also designed to increase diagnostic rates for 
dementia.
For all patients aged 75 and over who had an emergency admission involving a hospital stay 
of at least 72 hours, FAIR rewarded hospitals according to their performance on three 
indicators (1) Find, (2) Assess & Identify and (3) Refer individuals for specialist diagnosis and 
follow up.  Each indicator was scored 0-100%, with payment triggered by achieving at least 
90% on all three indicators in any consecutive three months.  
To control for the effect of FAIR on QOF dementia registers, we derived a time-varying 
measure of hospital effort based on the first two FAIR indicators only, because the third 
indicator (Refer) was defined differently in the final year and its performance data were 
not published.  
We converted the two hospital trust-level scores to weighted GP practice average values.  
To match the CQUIN target population, we extracted Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data 
on the number of emergency admissions in each GP practice for all people 75 and over with 
inpatient stays of at least 72 hours. We attributed hospital effort to the practice as the 
weighted average CQUIN scores, where the weights were the proportion of each practices 
emergency admissions (as defined above) to each hospital. The CQUIN scheme operated 
9from 2012-13 but data were not collected that year.  Therefore, this variable was set to zero 
for all practices for the period before 2013-14. 
As dementia registers are affected by factors other than incentive schemes, the analysis also 
adjusted for the following time-varying practice characteristics: practice list size (i.e. number 
of registered patients); the proportion of patients aged 65 and over; a measure of overall 
achievement on the QOF clinical domains;20 whether the practice had a GMS (General 
Medical Services) contract; deciles of the practice doctor-patient ratio (full time equivalent 
(FTE) GPs per 1000 registered patients); practice deprivation (the percentage of practice 
patients living in the 20% most deprived small areas in England); and a measure of access 
(the percentage of patients living in urban areas).  
To adjust for regional effects, we included variables for each practices Clinical 
Commissioning Group (CCG) using NHS Englands list of active practices.  CCGs for practices 
that had closed were identified by linking a National Audit Office mapping file to the ONS 
Postcode Directory.
Statistical modelling
Our unit of analysis was the GP practice. We modelled the two practice schemes, DES18 and 
DIS, as binary participation indicators and evaluated their impact on the rate as defined 
above.  Our econometric design needed to accommodate multiple incentive schemes as 
well as the different times the schemes were introduced and taken up. 
We identified different types of participants for the 3-year DES18 scheme and for the 6-
month DIS scheme, distinguishing practices into  categories according to the number and 
10
order of years of participation (Table 2).  For example, a practice that only participated in 
the first two years of DES18 (but not the third year) was categorised as Y/Y/N.  
TABLE 2 HERE
Our methodological framework was a difference-in-differences (DID) design.21 We 
compared the difference in rates before and after the introduction of the schemes by 
participation type using linear mixed effects models. These models assume that, in the 
absence of the intervention, outcome differences between participants and non-
participants are constant over time. Therefore, any differences in rates observed in the 
post-intervention period over and above the time trend can be attributed to the incentive 
scheme. This effect is measured by the coefficient on the policy variable. We applied a DID 
model with multiple periods22-24  (technical details are in Appendix B).
The post-estimation predict function was used to derive predicted rates under 
hypothetical participation scenarios, enabling us to estimate the national impact on 
dementia registers.  Analyses were undertaken in Stata v14.2.  
Results
Descriptive analysis
From March 2013 to March 2016, the total number of people listed on GP dementia 
registers in England increased from 309,461 to 432,727, i.e. a net rise of 123,266 individuals.  
The number diagnosed will be higher than this figure, because some newly diagnosed 
patients replaced individuals on the register who died. 
11
Figure 1 shows how the gap between the mean expected and mean recorded dementia 
registers varied over time. There was an upward trend in recorded dementia disease 
registers, whereas the rate of increase in expected values was lower.  Consequently, the gap 
between recorded and expected registers has narrowed.   The periods when DES18 and DIS 
were active are shown as shaded areas. 
FIGURE 1 HERE
From March 2013 to March 2016, the mean percentage of expected cases that was 
recorded on GP dementia registers increased from 51.8% to 68.6%.  Figure 2 shows how this 
rate varied by participation in (a) DES18 and (b) DIS.  By March 2016, practices participating 
in DES18 in all three years had a smaller gap between recorded and expected registers (i.e. 
higher outcome rate) on average than other practices.  When comparing participation in 
DIS, the unadjusted data show a distinct divergence in trends around the time the 
intervention was introduced.  
FIGURE 2 HERE
Regression analysis
While the unadjusted data suggested that practices participating in the schemes closed the 
gap between their recorded and expected registers at a faster rate than non-participants, 
the difference-in-differences analysis tested whether the observed differences were 
explained by confounding factors.  
TABLE 3 HERE
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Table 3 shows results from the linear random effects regression model applied to the 
balanced panel.  The upward trend in the rates shown in Figure 2 is reflected in the 
increasing coefficients of the year dummies (beta coefficients, Appendix B). Relative to its 
value in 2006-07, the rate increased by 0.35 percentage points in 2007-08, by 16.4 
percentage points by 2012-13 and by 31.0 percentage points by 2015-16.
The estimates for the DES18 participation groups showed no difference between the rates 
of practices that never participated in DES18 and the other practice groups in the pre-
intervention period, with the exception of practices that participated only in the final year of 
the scheme (participation variables are the gamma coefficients, Appendix B). Similarly, the 
rates for DIS participants did not differ significantly from those of non-participants in the 
pre-intervention period. 
The policy variables (delta coefficients, Appendix B) for DES18 were positive and significant. 
The DES18 scheme increased the rate for the intervention practices by 1.44 percentage 
points more than the increase in the rate for non-participating practices. DES18 had a 
significant effect in reducing the gap between recorded and expected registers (P < 0.001). 
The effect of DIS was larger with an estimated 3.59 percentage points increase in the rate (P 
< 0.001).
The effect of the hospital scheme (FAIR) was not statistically significant.  Higher overall 
achievement on the QOF clinical domain presumably reflected better overall practice quality 
which helped close the gap between the recorded and expected prevalence of dementia.  
Practices with larger proportions of patients living in urban areas and practices with more 
disadvantaged patients had smaller gaps between recorded and expected dementia 
registers (i.e. higher rates).  Practices with a higher proportion of individuals aged 65 and 
13
above had significantly lower rates (P < 0.001), as did practices with a GMS contract (P < 
0.05).
To quantify the added value of the schemes, we predicted the rates under hypothetical 
participation scenarios. Figure 3 shows the effects of the schemes for the 4,594 practices 
that participated in DES18 in all three years and that also participated in DIS. The black line 
shows the mean recorded rate. The other four lines depict the predicted rates under four 
scenarios of practice participation: i) both in DES18 and DIS; ii) only in DIS; iii) only in DES18; 
iv) neither in DES18 nor in DIS. 
The first scenario is the mean predicted rate assuming practices participated fully in both 
DES18 and DIS (as they did in this subsample). The last three scenarios are hypothetical 
(predicted) counterfactuals: for instance, the fourth scenario predicts the rates that would 
have been observed had these practices not participated in either scheme. 
Had all practices in the unbalanced panel participated fully in both schemes, these predicted 
values suggest that national dementia registers would have increased by 48,685.  As 
participation levels were suboptimal, the net effect of the schemes was to increase registers 
by 40,767 (59% of which was attributable to DES18).  
FIGURE 3 HERE
Sensitivity analysis
The results were robust to two sensitivity analyses (results are shown in Appendix C). First, 
we applied the model to the unbalanced panel of 7,529 practices totalling 74,241 practice-
year observations. Both policy variables remained significant with the size of the effects very 
similar to the estimates from the balanced panel analysis.
14
The base case analysis assumed that the effects of the schemes did not persist beyond the 
period of active participation. In the second sensitivity analysis, we estimated a model that 
assumed the effect of the DES18 persisted after the practice exited the scheme.  In this 
specification, four types of practices were defined by the year in which the practice entered 
the scheme (if at all).  Under this design, the change in rate between 2012-13 and 2015-16 
for each of the participating groups relative to the change in rate for the non-participating 
group did not vary by participation status each year, as in our base model. The DES18 policy 
effect (1.38) was significant and similar in size to the effect estimated in our base model 
(1.44).
Discussion
This national study of two primary care financial incentive schemes provides evidence that 
they helped to tackle the problem of underdiagnosis in dementia.  On average, a practices 
QOF dementia register rose from 28 individuals (March 2007) to 42 prior to the first 
schemes introduction (March 2013), and stood at 59 when the schemes ended (March 
2016).  Participation in DES18, which incentivised timely assessment and support by general 
practice, contributed to these numbers by increasing dementia registers amongst 
participating practices by 1.17 individuals each year on average.  Participation in the 
Dementia Identification Scheme (DIS), which paid practices £55 for each net addition to 
the dementia register over a 6-month period, had an even larger impact, delivering an 
average net increase in registers of 2.98.  
In common with most evaluations of pay-for-performance schemes, this study faced several 
methodological challenges9 10  which we discuss below.
15
Ideally, participation in the schemes would have been randomly allocated to minimise the 
risk of known and unknown biases affecting results.  However, difference-in-differences 
(DID) analysis is a good alternative when randomisation is not possible because policies 
have been rolled out nationally. DID assumes the intervention groups have a common trend 
with the control group, and the regression analysis (participation coefficients) supports that 
assumption.  We controlled for practice characteristics we believed could affect diagnosis 
rates, but cannot rule out the possibility that other factors we could not measure, such as 
the availability of memory clinics, may have influenced results. 
A key challenge in this study was defining participation in the schemes.  Some practices 
could be clearly identified as participants or non-participants, but others were grey 
practices that signed up to the DES18 scheme but then, apparently, did nothing  or so the 
assessments data suggest.  Are these practices failed participants (as we assumed) or non-
participants?  This matters because our models presuppose a clear distinction between the 
intervention and control groups.  For DIS, NHS England provided a list of participants.  The 
list was based on data provided by their Local Area Teams for payment purposes and was 
subject to numerous checks.  
Our study relied on administrative datasets which are subject to the usual challenges in 
relation to coding errors and missing data.  Data on FAIR were only available for two of the 
three indicators in 2015/16, so our measure only partially captures hospitals efforts in 
diagnosing dementia patients.  For approximately 15% of practices that had fewer than six 
patients in nursing homes, data were suppressed to prevent disclosure. We imputed these 
missing data with random values between 1 and 5. 1  In addition, the age / sex distribution 
1 Numbers of practices with imputed random value: 2009/10: 1085 (15.2%); 2010/11: 1107 (15.5%); 2011/12: 
1102 (15.4%).
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of nursing home patients in practices is unknown so we imputed national distributions 
(Appendix A). 
We do not know of any previous studies quantifying the impact of schemes to boost 
diagnosis rates of dementia.  However, the targeting of financial incentives on GPs in order 
to achieve quality improvements underpins the major policy initiative of the QOF 
programme.  Research on the QOF suggests that overall this policy has been successful in 
promoting quality improvements  although at relatively modest levels which tend to 
reduce over time  in the incentivised conditions. 12 13 25 26  In our study, both DES18 and the 
DIS schemes appeared effective.  The impact of DIS is unsurprising given the direct and 
time-limited nature of the incentive, which was designed to focus attention on the issue of 
underdiagnosis of dementia. There were calls from doctors for DIS to be withdrawn,27
criticising it as cash for diagnosis,28 and unethical and dangerous for patients;29
nonetheless, over three-quarters of practices opted in.  We also found evidence suggesting 
the effects of both schemes persisted after practices had exited the schemes, which 
supports findings from an evaluation of the withdrawal of QOF indicators. 30
The hospital CQUIN scheme, FAIR, appears not to have had the expected trickledown 
effect on GP registers. Previous research has found little evidence of any effect of CQUIN 
schemes aside from those involving hip fracture.31
NHS England achieved its two-thirds ambition for dementia in November 2015.5  During the 
years when the schemes were active, total numbers on the dementia registers increased by 
123,266.  However, only one third (40,767) of these additional cases are attributable to the 
two schemes.  The schemes effect on the number of newly diagnosed individuals will be 
17
higher than this figure, because some additions to the register replace individuals who have 
died.  
Total expenditure on the schemes has not been published, but we estimate the budget to 
be around £131m, comprising £5m for DIS 17 and £42m available in each of the three years 
for DES18.32  Despite the controversy over DIS, our results illustrate that direct, targeted and 
time-limited financial incentives for GPs work and, as a result, quality of care has likely been 
enhanced for those individuals whose dementia was identified through the schemes.  We 
also found evidence suggesting that the impact of the schemes persists after they ended, 
although our evaluation had limited follow-up. Policy makers may consider repeating this 
approach either for dementia or for other disease areas where early diagnosis is considered 
beneficial.
Remaining gaps in the evidence base include the wider benefits and unintended 
consequences of the schemes, and the true cost of delivering the schemes, as opposed to 
the budgeted expenditure. Although our study demonstrated the schemes were successful 
in closing the diagnosis gap, a comprehensive assessment of the cost-effectiveness of using 
financial incentives to improve diagnosis rates would require further research in these two 
key areas. 
18
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the outcome and explanatory variables: Balanced panel, 2006-07 
to 2015-16
Variable Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Min Max N
Recorded dementia register 39.75 36.46 0 631 71,420
Expected dementia register 80.91 64.34 0.02 1135.91 71,420
Mean rate (100*recorded / expected) 49.07 21.28 0 100 71,420
DES18 participation (%): 3 years 79.11 71,420
DES18 participation (%): 2 years 15.93 71,420
DES18 participation (%): 1 year 3.43 71,420
DIS participation (%) 75.93 71,420
Hospital effort (2013-14 to 2015-16 only) * 86.06 17.14 0 100 21,426
Practice list size (1,000) 7.28 4.23 0.01 60.38 71,420
% practice patients 65 or older 16.05 5.74 0.00 47.99 71,420
Weighted achievement on the QOF clinical domain 80.73 4.63 0.05 99.79 71,420
GMS contract 0.59 0.49 0 1 71,420
Full-time equivalent GPs per 1000 patients 0.57 1.01 0.01 266.67 71,420
% patients living in 20% most deprived areas 23.12 26.20 0.00 99.65 71,420
%  patients living in urban areas 82.71 32.45 0.00 100 71,420
*Hospital effort assumed to be zero from 2006-07 to 2012-13; N = practice-years
excluding retainers/registrars
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Table 2: Participation in DES18 or DIS: balanced panel, 2006-07 to 2015-16
Practice-
years
Percent
Mean dementia 
register
Years of participation: 3 56,500 79.11 42.67
Y/Y/Y 56,500 79.11 42.67
Years of participation: 2 11,380 15.93 29.29
Y/Y/N 1,280 1.79 33.08
Y/N/Y 1,420 1.99 28.31
N/Y/Y 8,680 12.15 28.89
Years of participation: 1 2,450 3.43 25.54
Y/N/N 440 0.62 31.82
N/Y/N 700 0.98 22.85
N/N/Y 1,310 1.83 23.63
No participation 1,090 1.53 31.09
N/N/N 1,090 1.53 31.09
DES18 
participation
Total 71,420 100 39.75
No 17,190 24.07 34.45DIS 
participation Yes 54,230 75.93 41.43
Total 71,420 100 39.75
Note: as this is a balanced panel, the number of practices contributing data can be inferred 
by dividing practice-years by 10. 
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Table 3: Linear random effects results: Balanced panel, 2006-07 to 2015-16
Variable Coefficient 95% CI
FY is 2006-07 (ref.)
FY is 2007-08 0.345** [0.096, 0.593]
FY is 2008-09 2.397*** [2.073, 2.721]
FY is 2009-10 5.795*** [5.427, 6.162]
FY is 2010-11 7.908*** [7.508, 8.307]
FY is 2011-12 12.556*** [12.121, 12.992]
FY is 2012-13 16.419*** [15.934, 16.903]
FY is 2013-14 19.022*** [17.563, 20.482]
FY is 2014-15 26.562*** [24.814, 28.311]
FY is 2015-16 30.977*** [29.329, 32.624]
Practice participation in DES18 in 2013-14/2014-15/ 2015-16
(participation is indicated by Yes (Y), non-participation by No (N)
N/N/N (ref.)
Y/Y/Y 2.010 [-0.638, 4.658]
Y/Y/N 1.275 [-2.411, 4.960]
Y/N/Y -0.207 [-3.562, 3.148]
Y/N/N -0.909 [-5.114, 3.295]
N/Y/Y -0.720 [-3.523, 2.082]
N/Y/N -1.843 [-6.382, 2.695]
N/N/Y -3.438* [-6.843, -0.033]
Participation in DIS 0.770 [-0.030, 1.570]
Policy variable (DES18) 1.439*** [0.669, 2.210]
Policy variable (DIS) 3.594*** [2.785, 4.403]
Hospital effort (FAIR) 0.008 [-0.007, 0.024]
Practice list size (in 1,000) 0.255*** [0.172, 0.338]
% of practice patients 65 or older -0.559*** [-0.651, -0.467]
QOF achievement in the clinical domain 0.301*** [0.253, 0.349]
GMS contract -0.650* [-1.187, -0.112]
Deciles of FTE GPs per 1,000 patients
Decile 1 (ref.)
Decile 2 0.096 [-0.590, 0.781]
Decile 3 -0.013 [-0.702, 0.675]
Decile 4 0.077 [-0.609, 0.764]
Decile 5 -0.066 [-0.756, 0.624]
Decile 6 0.182 [-0.515, 0.879]
Decile 7 0.294 [-0.397, 0.985]
Decile 8 0.168 [-0.534, 0.871]
Decile 9 0.385 [-0.348, 1.118]
Decile 10 0.518 [-0.287, 1.322]
% of practice patients living in 20% most deprived areas 0.033** [0.012, 0.054]
% of practice patients living in urban areas 0.019** [0.007, 0.031]
Within R-squared 0.489
Between R-squared 0.196
Overall R-squared 0.360
Standard deviation of practice random effect (sigma_u) 12.204
Intraclass correlation (rho) 0.508
95% confidence intervals in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Models also adjust for CCG (results not shown); 
R2=36%
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Figure 1: Gap between mean recorded dementia register and mean expected dementia register
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Figure 2: Trends in mean practice outcome rates by years of participation in (a) DES18 (b) DIS
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Figure 3: Trends in mean of the recorded and predicted practice outcome rates: DES18 and DIS
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Appendix A: Datasets used for the analysis
Dataset Reporting 
level
Years Type of variable(s) 
derived
Details of variables
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) GP practice 2006-07 
2015-16
Dependent variable 
(numerator) 
Source of dementia register counts
Control variables Overall QOF achievement on clinical domain
Practice list size
% practice patients 65+
Cognitive Function and Ageing Study II (CFAS 
II) 1
Residential 
setting
2008 2011 
a
Dependent variable
(denominator)
Consensus estimates of dementia prevalence by age, gender 
and setting (nursing home / community). 
Used to derive expected dementia registers. 
Numbers of Nursing Home GP Patients by 
practice in England b
GP practice 2006   
2015
Dependent variable
(denominator)
Used to derive expected dementia registers. 
ONS  census data Residential 
setting
2011 Dependent variable Proportion of patients in different age and gender bands (65+) 
in care homes. 
Used to derive expected dementia registers. 
General and Personal Medical Services 
dataset (GMS) c
GP practice 2011/12 
2015-16
Dependent variable 
(denominator).
Proportion of practice patients in different age and gender 
bands (65+) used to derive expected dementia registers.  GMS 
contract status.
Dementia (facilitating timely diagnosis and 
support for people with dementia)  
assessments data
GP practice 2013-14 
2015-16
Policy variable Used to identify participation in Directed Enhanced Services 
(DES18): Facilitating Timely Diagnosis and Support for People 
with Dementia
Dementia Assessment and Referral Data 
Collection
NHS Trust 2013-14 
2015-16
Policy variable Published monthly and quarterly.  Used to identify NHS Trusts 
participating in the FAIR (Find; Assess & Investigate; Refer) 
CQUIN scheme
Attribution Dataset (ADS) GP practice 2006-07 
2015-16
Control variables Numbers of practice patients in each LSOA.  Used to generate 
practice-level weighted averages of rurality and deprivation 
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) Patients 2013-14 
2015-16
Control variable Used to calculate weights for deriving practice-level FAIR 
variable. 
ONS  urban LSOA 2004, 2011 Control variable Source of urban classifications. Combined with ADS to derive 
practice rurality measure. 2004 data used for missing values in 
unbalanced panel. 
ONS deprivation LSOA 2010, 2015 Control variable Source of IMD classifications.  Combined with ADS to derive 
practice deprivation measure. 2010 data used for missing 
Dataset Reporting 
level
Years Type of variable(s) 
derived
Details of variables
values in unbalanced panel.   
CCG code GP practice 2006-07 
2015-16
Control variable Practice CCG code
a These are the survey years; a unique value was derived for each age/gender/setting band.  CFAS II prevalence rates are used in NHS Englands performance framework 
for CCGs to identify areas where dementia diagnosis rates are below expected levels.2
b Positive values <6 are suppressed, so were imputed using a random value between 1 and 5
c The method of GMS data collection changed in 2015-16 and data are missing for around 15% of practices.
Acronyms: ADS: attribution dataset; CCG: clinical commissioning group; CQUIN: Commissioning for Quality and Innovation; DSA: Data Sharing Agreement; GMS: General 
and Personal Medical Services dataset; IMD: index of multiple deprivation; LSOA: lower-layer super output area; ONS: Office for National Statistics; QOF: quality and 
outcomes framework
Data sharing
All the data used in the analyses can be freely downloaded from the web, with the following exceptions:
1. General and Personal Medical Services dataset (GMS) (2006/7 to 2012/13) were accessed via a Data Sharing Agreement between the 
Centre for Health Economics, University of York, and NHS Digital; 
2. Numbers of practice patients in nursing homes, 2006/07 to 2012/13: supplied by NHS England;
3. Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), 2006/07 to 2015/16: provided by NHS Digital under a Data Sharing Agreement;
4. Attribution Dataset (ADS), 2006/07 to 2013/14: provided under a Data Sharing Agreement with NHS England;
5. List of DIS participants (supplied by NHS England).
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Appendix B: Difference-in-differences (DID) model 
The simplest DID design is a linear mixed effects model with two time periods ʹ pre and post 
intervention years ʹ and a single intervention. In our setting, practices indexed by i, can 
participate in DES18 schemes at any or all of three time periods (2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16) 
and can concurrently participate in DES18 and DIS in 2014-15. To account for this, we apply 
a DID model with multiple periods. 
1-3
  The specification includes a full set of time period 
dummies, seven binary indicators indicating different types of DES18 participants for the 3-
year DES18 scheme (as defined in Supplementary Table 2), a binary indicator of DIS 
participation, and two binary policy variables: 
1
tP  for DES18 and 
2
tP  for DIS (in analogy to the 
interaction term in the simple case) defined as unity for practices and time periods subject 
to the interventions.   
The random error 
i
u  is introduced to capture practice specific time invariant effects and 
follows a normal distribution 2(0, )
u
N V
1 2006 10 2015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2
1 2
it
YYY YYN YNY YNN NYY NYN NNY
t t it i it
y t t
DES DES DES DES DES DES DES DIS
P P bX u
D E E
J J J J J J J J
G G H
   
       
    
  (1) 
where 2 2(0, ),  (0, )
i u it
u N N HV H V  and itH is independent of iu . 
The compound error term 
it i it
e u H   is independent across practices but not within a 
practice. The within practice correlation is the sum of intraclass correlation  
2
2 2
u
u H
VU V V   plus serial correlation ( )it isE H H
To account for within practices serial correlation we cluster standard errors at the same 
level as the random effect (i.e. at practice level). 
The beta coefficients of the time period dummy variables 1 10, ,E E  explain the effect of 
aggregate temporal factors that cause changes in the outcome (i.e. the rate), even in the 
absence of interventions. The gamma coefficients 1 7, ,J J   capture differences in rates with 
respect to the DES18 reference group (never participating in DES18, NNN) prior to the 
intervention.  
For instance, the difference in average outcomes between practices in the group YYY and 
practices in the group NNN in year 2007 after adjusting for practice characteristics is: 
2007 2007 2 1 2 1
( ) ( )YYY NNN
t t
Y Y D E J D E J         
Similarly, 
8
J captures differences in rates between participants and non-participants in DIS 
prior to the intervention.  The policy effects of the incentive schemes are captured by the 
delta coefficients 1 2 and G G .  
For instance, the difference in outcomes for the group YYY between 2012-13 and 2013-14 is: 
2013 2012 8 1 1 7 1 8 7 1
( ) ( ) ( )YYY YYY
t t
Y Y D E J G D E J E E G             and the difference in outcomes 
for the group NNN between 2012-13 and 2013-14 is: 
2013 2012 8 7 8 7
( ) ( ) ( )NNN NNN
t t
Y Y D E D E E E        
Therefore, the difference-in differences estimate (which we call DES18 policy variable) is: 
2013 2012 2013 2012 1
( ) ( )YYY YYY NNN NNN
t t t t
Y Y Y Y G        
Note, that 
1
J appears in the calculation of the average outcome for the participating group 
in the post-intervention year 2013 (
2013
YYY
t
Y  ) but cancels out in the DiD estimate. 
The base model allows for practices entering the DES18 scheme at different time periods 
and the effects of DES18 are assumed not to persist once the practice exits the scheme. As 
an example, Table 1 presents the year-to-year effects for two types of practices: those that 
enter the scheme in 2013/14, continue in 2014/15, and exit the scheme in 2015-16 
(DES18YYN); and those that take up DES18 in 2013/14, interrupt their participation in 
2014/15, and re-join the scheme in 2015-16 (DES18YNY). For the DES18YYN group, the scheme 
is in effect in 2014-15 but not in 2015-16 and therefore the change in rate from 2014/15 to 
2015-16 compared to the non-participating control group is -ɷ1 (third row, third column). 
For the DES18YNY group the change is ɷ1 (third row, sixth column) implying a 2 ɷ1 percentage 
points higher rate for the DES18YNY group compared to the DES18YYN group.  
Appendix Table 1: Year to year effects of the DES18 scheme for the DES18YYN and DES18YNY groups 
DES18YYN DES18YNY
2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
2011-13 (Pre-
DES18)
ɷ1 ɷ1 0 ɷ1 0 ɷ1
2013-14 0 -ɷ1 -ɷ1 0
2014-15 -ɷ1 ɷ1
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Appendix C
Sensitivity analysis 1: results using an unbalanced panel, 2006-07 to 2015-16
Variable Coefficient 95% CI
FY is 2006-07 (ref.)
FY is 2007-08 0.363** [0.110, 0.615]
FY is 2008-09 2.409*** [2.081, 2.736]
FY is 2009-10 5.913*** [5.544, 6.282]
FY is 2010-11 7.997*** [7.588, 8.406]
FY is 2011-12 12.576*** [12.134, 13.019]
FY is 2012-13 16.349*** [15.856, 16.843]
FY is 2013-14 18.669*** [17.156, 20.183]
FY is 2014-15 25.997*** [24.179, 27.815]
FY is 2015-16 30.393*** [28.681, 32.105]
Practice participation in DES18 in 2013-14/2014-15/ 
2015-16
(participation is indicated by Yes (Y), non-participation by 
No (N)
N/N/N (ref.)
Y/Y/Y 2.314 [-0.574, 5.203]
Y/Y/N 2.017 [-1.942, 5.976]
Y/N/Y 1.378 [-2.191, 4.946]
Y/N/N -0.148 [-4.698, 4.403]
N/Y/Y -0.239 [-3.284, 2.806]
N/Y/N -1.319 [-5.762, 3.124]
N/N/Y -3.249 [-6.834, 0.335]
Participation in DIS 0.802 [-0.017, 1.622]
Policy variable (DES18) 1.405***  [0.619, 2.191]
Policy variable (DIS) 3.583*** [2.768, 4.399]
Hospital effort (FAIR) 0.012 [-0.004, 0.028]
Practice list size (in 1,000) 0.217*** [0.132, 0.302]
% of practice patients 65 or older -0.449*** [-0.565, -0.333]
QOF achievement in the clinical domain 0.299*** [0.250, 0.348]
GMS contract -0.950*** [-1.497, -0.403]
Deciles of FTE GPs per 1,000 patients
Decile 1 (ref.)
Decile 2 0.119 [-0.558, 0.797]
Decile 3 -0.165 [-0.845, 0.516]
Decile 4 -0.007 [-0.688, 0.675]
Decile 5 -0.183 [-0.867, 0.501]
Decile 6 0.136 [-0.556, 0.828]
Decile 7 0.200 [-0.488, 0.889]
Decile 8 0.057 [-0.642, 0.757]
Decile 9 0.301 [-0.430, 1.033]
Decile 10 0.755 [-0.057, 1.567]
Variable Coefficient 95% CI
% of practice patients living in 20% most deprived areas 0.044*** [0.021, 0.067]
% of practice patients living in urban areas 0.022*** [0.009, 0.034]
Within R-squared 0.468
Between R-squared 0.202
Overall R-squared 0.347
Standard deviation of practice random effect (sigma_u) 12.646
Intraclass correlation (rho) 0.508
95% confidence intervals in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Models also adjust for CCG (results not shown)
Sensitivity analysis 2: results assuming persistent effects. Balanced panel over 2006-07 to 
2015-16
Variable Coefficient 95% CI
FY is 2006-07 (ref.)
FY is 2007-08 0.343** [0.095, 0.592]
FY is 2008-09 2.395*** [2.071, 2.719]
FY is 2009-10 5.794*** [5.427, 6.162]
FY is 2010-11 7.905*** [7.506, 8.305]
FY is 2011-12 12.553*** [12.117, 12.989]
FY is 2012-13 16.414*** [15.930, 16.899]
FY is 2013-14 19.058*** [17.544, 20.572]
FY is 2014-15 26.516*** [24.692, 28.339]
FY is 2015-16 30.968*** [29.246, 32.690]
Practice participation in DES18 in2013-14/2014-15/ 2015-16
(participation is indicated by Yes (Y), non-participation by No 
(N)
N/N/N (ref.)
Y/-/-   (i.e.  Y/N/N or Y/N/Y or Y/Y/N or Y/Y/Y) 1.756 [-0.885, 4.397]
N/Y/- (i.e.  N/Y/N or N/Y/Y) -0.915 [-3.706, 1.875]
N/N/Y -3.480* [-6.885, -0.075]
Participation in DIS 0.966* [0.174, 1.757]
Policy variable (DES18) 1.379** [0.473, 2.285]
Policy variable (DIS) 3.659*** [2.848, 4.470]
Hospital effort (FAIR) 0.009 [-0.007, 0.024]
Practice list size (in 1,000) 0.258*** [0.176, 0.341]
% of practice patients 65 or older -0.556*** [-0.648, -0.464]
QOF achievement in the clinical domain 0.302*** [0.254, 0.349]
GMS contract -0.656* [-1.194, -0.117]
Decile 1 (ref.)
Decile 2 0.093 [-0.593, 0.779]
Decile 3 -0.014 [-0.703, 0.674]
Decile 4 0.073 [-0.614, 0.760]
Decile 5 -0.068 [-0.758, 0.623]
Variable Coefficient 95% CI
Decile 6 0.180 [-0.517, 0.878]
Decile 7 0.293 [-0.398, 0.985]
Decile 8 0.168 [-0.535, 0.871]
Decile 9 0.385 [-0.347, 1.118]
Decile 10 0.517 [-0.287, 1.322]
% of practice patients living in 20% most deprived areas 0.033** [0.012, 0.055]
% of practice patients living in urban areas 0.019** [0.007, 0.031]
Within R-squared 0.489
Between R-squared 0.195
Overall R-squared 0.360
Standard deviation of practice random effect (sigma_u) 12.206
Intraclass correlation (rho) 0.508
95% confidence intervals in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Models also adjust for CCG (results not shown)
